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After the Rebellion, What’s Next for Russia?

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion fizzled, and Russian President Vladimir Putin remained in power. Still, some say Putin’s standing has eroded and wonder just what will happen next in Russia.

Keen observers disagree on one point—some say we’ve witnessed the beginning of the end of Putin’s reign; others don’t think so—but consensus among commentators seems to be that in Russia, whatever follows this short-lived rebellion won’t be good.

“What will follow this rebellion is an interlude of distraction, recrimination, and uncertainty, as Putin deals not only with the logistics of getting things back to normal but also with the humiliation he has just been dealt and the revenge he is likely to pursue,” Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage write for Foreign Affairs. “None of this will pass quickly. … The United States and its allies will have to manage and mitigate the consequences of instability in Russia. In all scenarios, the West will need to seek transparency about the control of Russian nuclear weapons … Instability in Russia is unlikely to stay in Russia. It could spread across the region, from Armenia to Belarus.”

Fix, Kimmage and others also agree on something else: If Putin were to lose power, whoever succeeded him might be more aggressive and nationalistic even than Putin.

In another Foreign Affairs essay, Vladislav Zubok adds, grimly, that “in harking back to 1917”—the year of the Bolshevik Revolution, cited by Putin in his speech condemning Prigozhin’s march toward Moscow—“Putin and his critics and adversaries alike were reaching for the wrong historical analogy. What is taking place in Russia right now bears less resemblance to the events of 1917 than to those of an earlier era: the so-called Time of Troubles, or Smuta, which lasted from 1604 to 1613. During this period, the Russian dynasty of the Rurikids came to a violent end, and it took a decade of war and civil upheaval before the Romanov dynasty consolidated monarchical authority. In the meantime, Russia almost ceased to exist as a sovereign entity—a fate that could befall Russia again today because Putin’s personalized autocratic rule has made it hard to imagine an orderly succession.”

… and Wagner …

After fighters with Prigozhin’s Wagner private military group marched toward Moscow, Putin has given them three choices: join the regular Russian military, go home, or go (as Prigozhin has reportedly done) to Belarus.

Detailing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s self-purported role in negotiating an end to Prigozhin’s rebellion, Le Monde’s Faustine Vincent writes: “Under a triumphant façade, the Belarusian leader now hosts (an alleged) war criminal at the head of a company of mercenaries known for their (alleged) exactions, rapes, murders, and tortures in a number of conflicts.”

Before its role in Russia’s full-fledged war on Ukraine, Wagner had been known for its mercenary activities in Syria and Africa. Has Prigozhin’s rebellion ended that line of business?

“(I)t seems unlikely that Wagner will up sticks in Africa,” The Economist writes. “The organisation is much more than just one man and it has a vested interest in staying put. Moreover the Kremlin will be loth to lose what has been a source of influence on the continent. Most probably, Wagner will retreat from Africa only if Africans themselves start to see Russia as a weak and unreliable partner. … That points to an irony that will not be lost on many African observers. Russia’s president pitches his country not only as a strong ally for African leaders but something of a model. Yet the very same group that his government has sent to help African leaders fight internal enemies has itself staged an uprising in Russia. That is hardly an advertisement for a regime selling coup protection to autocrats and juntas abroad.”

… and Ukraine?

If there were any winners in Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, some have suggested Ukraine is one.

Putin’s war effort has been flagging since it began. “Now, a weekend mutiny by Prigozhin and his mercenary force has further complicated Putin’s pursuit of the war,” political scientist Ronald Suny argues at The Conversation. “He looks weaker, and the most competent fighting force in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is no longer in existence to prosecute the war.”

Wagner delivered Russia its only major battlefield victory since last year—seizing the destroyed Ukrainian city of Bakhmut—but Prigozhin’s rebellion threw into question Wagner fighters’ future presence on the battlefield.

“(B)efore this weekend, Putin seemed to have a chance at sustaining his war in Ukraine longer than the West could sustain its interest,” Elliot Ackerman writes for The Atlantic. “But the loss of the Wagner Group necessitates that Putin rely wholly on the Russian military. This reduces his ability to insulate the Russian population from the costs of war, diminishing the political space for such an approach. … Even if Ukraine hasn’t yet retaken meaningful swaths of territory, it’s taken back something every bit as important: the strategic initiative. The strain Ukrainians placed on Prigozhin’s forces in Bakhmut, Kherson, and a host of other places contributed to this rebellion, and this rebellion is again placing the Ukrainians in the driver’s seat of the war.”